
Liens 101 – Scott Schedules
April 4, 2025Executive Summary:
In a decision released in February of this year, the Honourable Justice J. R. Henderson declined to rescind an agreement of purchase and sale for a pre-built, top-floor condominium unit after the developer added an additional floor. Even though this change constituted a “material change,” according to Justice Henderson, the purchasers had failed to respond within the timeline required by Ontario’s Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19 (Condo Act), thereby eliminating their right to rescind.
Background:
On March 16, 2022, the purchasers, Chirag Jitendrabhai Trivedi and Priyankaben Chirag Trivedi (Trivedi), entered into an agreement with the developer, 2607305 Ontario Inc. o/a Urbane Communities (Urbane), for the purchase of a residential condominium unit in Urbane’s condominium development located at 7549 Kalar Road, Niagara Falls, Ontario (Agreement).
In the disclosure statement provided to the Trivedis upon entering into the Agreement, the unit, described as Unit 316, was to be the top unit located on the third floor. There were not going to be any units above Unit 316.
Construction proceeded for nearly two years, and then on February 22, 2024, Urbane delivered a Revised Disclosure Statement to the Trivedis by email. Among other items, the RDS informed the Trivedis that Urbane had changed the condominium development to include a fourth floor, and there would, therefore, be a unit located above Unit 316.
Starting on March 19, 2024, the Trivedi’s lawyer exchanged several emails with Urbane about the changes, in what the Court described as “negotiations about this issue.” At no point during this time did the Trivedi’s communicate the possibility of rescinding the Agreement to Urbane. Rescission was not even discussed as a possibility until early June 2024.
On June 12, 2024, 85 days after Urbane delivered the Revised Disclosure Statement, the Trivedi’s commenced an application requesting a declaration that the addition of the fourth floor to the condominium development constituted a material change which entitled them to rescind the Agreement. They also sought the return of the deposit they paid towards the purchase of Unit 316, with interest.
In response, Urbane took the position that the addition of the fourth floor was not a material change, which permitted the Trivedis to rescind the Agreement. In the alternative, Urbane argued that, if the change did constitute a material change, the Trivedis are still not entitled to rescind the Agreement because they failed to exercise their right to rescind within the time limit prescribed by the Condo Act.
The Condo Act, Right to Rescind:
Under section 72(1) of the Condo Act, developers are required to deliver a current disclosure statement to the purchasers upon signing. The agreement is considered not to be binding on the purchasers until such delivery takes place.
Under section 74 of the Condo Act, whenever a developer undertakes a material change which alters the information originally provided in the disclosure statement, they are required to prepare a revised disclosure statement or send a notice to the purchaser regarding the changes. From there, the purchaser has ten (10) days to send written notice that they are rescinding the agreement due to the material change.
It is important to note that the change must meet the definition of a “material change,” as set out in the Condo Act, for this section to be triggered and the timeline for a response to commence, with a material change constituting:
“a change or a series of changes that a reasonable purchaser, on an objective basis, would have regarded collectively as sufficiently important to the decision to purchase a unit or proposed unit in the corporation that it is likely that the purchaser would not have entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for the unit or the proposed unit or would have exercised the right to rescind such an agreement.”
In other words, would the purchasers still have agreed had they known at the outset what the final design of the condominium would be, or would they have chosen not to enter into the agreement at all?
Keep in mind that under subsection 74(5) of the Condo Act, if a purchaser is unsure whether a change constitutes a material change entitling them to rescind the agreement, instead of sending notice of rescission they can opt to commence an application in the Courts seeking a declaration on whether the changes are material changes entitling them to rescission, if commenced within ten (10) days of receiving the revised disclosure statement. This step will substitute the need to send notice of rescission within the same 10-day period and requires a court process to sort out the issues.
Relevant Facts:
The Trivedis argued that they entered into the Agreement, in part, because they wanted to reside on the top floor of the condominium development. They also paid more for a top-floor unit, with the price of the units increasing by $10,000 per floor, such that the Trivedi’s paid $10,000 more for Unit 316 than they would have paid for an identical unit on the second floor.
The Court found that the original location of Unit 316 being on the top floor was an important characteristic of the unit for the Trivedis. Although the development was not a particularly tall building, the top level of the development can still be described as the penthouse floor, which objectively provides additional privacy, less interference from neighbouring units, a more peaceful environment, and increased status within the building.
Concerning the rescission provisions under section 74, the Court found that Urbane had provided adequate notice to the Trivedis about the change and also provided them with a copy of the wording of section 74, so they were aware of their right to rescind early on. The Court determined that it was clear from the Revised Disclosure Statement that the Trivedi’s unit would no longer be on the top floor and that there would be another unit above their unit – a change which the Court already found was substantial enough to be a material change.
The Decision:
In the end, Justice Henderson determined that, while the change did constitute a material change, the Trivedi’s failed to send a notice of rescission within the 10-day timeline required by the Condo Act, and as such, lost the right to rescind the Agreement. As such, the Trivedi’s were also not entitled to a return of the deposit they paid for the unit.
Takeaways:
This case highlights the importance of understanding all statutory obligations when entering into a purchase agreement for a condominium unit, especially those that impose deadlines for certain actions. The Trivedi’s negotiations with the developer through their lawyer were not sufficient to put a hold on the 10-day deadline for a response; rather, the 10 days appear to be strictly enforced such that purchasers have to quickly decide their next steps.
It is also a good reminder that if a party wants to rely on the benefits provided by a statute, they must also abide by the obligations as well. The Trivedis sought a declaration that the addition of a fourth floor constituted a material change, but they did not take the steps available to them to address their concerns within the 10-day timeline imposed by the Condo Act. In other words, they wanted to have their cake and eat it too, but Justice Henderson correctly noted that if one section of a statute applies, then all other related and relevant sections apply as well. As such, if the Trivedis believed the change constituted a material change, they should have acted in accordance and provided notice within 10 days of receiving the Revised Disclosure Statement. By not doing so, they were statute-barred from the relief of rescission.
Case Reference: Trivedi v. 2607305 Ontario Inc., 2025 ONSC 72



